Purchasing life insurance is for the welfare of young children, particularly preteens, who are liquidity constrained. In this paper, we present a life cycle model of life insurance that takes into account the ages of these young beneciaries. We show that, as the child ages, the need for protection is reduced and, consequently, the size of contingent bequest may shrink. The demand for life insurance is positively related to the number, age differentials, living standards, and the time needed to reach adulthood. Also, the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty and the unfairness of the insurance market encourage precautionary saving JEL Classification: G22, D91
Introduction
According to Belth (1985) , life insurance purchase depends on how much and how long the needs of the bene¯ciary are. Young children, particularly preteens, who are liquidity constrained certainly need the breadwinner's support until they reach independence. We argue that a major factor in purchasing life insurance is the welfare of these young dependents. In this paper, we present a life cycle model of life insurance purchase that re°ects this need.
The standard model of the demand for life insurance, e.g. Fischer (1973) , assumes that the breadwinner maximizes his expected utility over an uncertain lifetime by choosing the level of consumption and life insurance. 1 The demand for life insurance thus obtained is dictated by the bequest function. Shorrocks (1979) pointed out that such a model is unsatisfactory because, among other things, the purchase of insurance is independent of the number or the circumstances of the bene¯ciaries. Subsequently, Lewis (1989) presented a model of the demand for life insurance that maximizes the bene¯ciary's utility, not the breadwinner's own utility. He argued that such an approach simulates the actual calculation of household insurance purchase. We contend that life insurance purchase should be a choice variable of a utility maximizing breadwinner who has the bene¯ciaries' best interest in mind.
Recall that in Fischer's model, if the breadwinner lives, he chooses his own consumption and nothing for his bene¯ciaries. If, however, the breadwinner dies, the bene¯ciary receives the contingent bequest (savings plus the net value of life insurance). The departure of our model from Fischer's is that we assume the breadwinner is altruistic towards his dependents while he is alive, not just after his death. To accomplish this, we include the recipient's utility function up to the \age of independence" in the breadwinner's optimization problem. Then, the age pro¯les of income transfer, contingent bequest, and the breadwinner's own consumption are jointly determined in the model. In contrast, Lewis approached the problem by treating the breadwinner's consumption and income transfer as given. Our model enables us to address the problem of life insurance purchase by itself or as a component of intergenerational transfer.
The literature of intergenerational transfer, 2 which emphasizes the interaction between generations, typically include the bene¯ciary's income and other strategic actions in the model. Because these models apply mainly to adult o®spring, they often have to exclude young children in the analysis. For example, in testing the altruistic theory, Wilhelm (1996) excluded children under age 25. Laitner and Juster (1996, p.895) recognized this point and presented a three-period model in which the middle period is a time of giving (to young o®spring). Our model goes even further to study the issues arising from the ages of the young dependents.
In this sense the proposed model emphasizes those \missing" years and hence complements the literature of intergenerational transfer.
The proposed model adds new results to the life cycle theory. We show that there is precautionary saving arising from the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty, when there are dependent children in the family. This precautionary saving rises with the breadwinner's hazard rate and the loading factor of the insurance market. The key to this result is that the Euler equation governing the breadwinner's consumption is discounted by the actuarial rate of interest, not the market interest rate. If the actuarial rate is greater than the subjective discount rate, then consumption rises with age. The presence of the loading factor in the Euler equation implies an additional rate of growth of consumption compared to the standard life cycle model. We work out a numerical example, using a CDC's Life Table, to illustrate the signi¯cance of this delayed consumption e®ect. The theory also predicts that an across-the-board increase in the loading factor produces an upward tilt to the consumption pro¯le, i.e., as the insurance market becomes less fair, more precautionary saving is encouraged.
The inclusion of the bene¯ciary's utility function in the objective function enables us to draw implications on the income transfer to young children. We show that the income transfer rises as the child ages and that the magnitude of the aggregate income transfer is signi¯cantly in°uenced by the number of children. In particular, the age pro¯le of the aggregate income transfer tends to peak just before the oldest child reaches independence. These results support Espenshade's (1984)¯ndings that older children are more expensive because, among other things, they are physically larger and have more activities. Our results are attributed to the breadwinner's altruism and lifetime uncertainty, and thus provide additional explanations for these observations.
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The implication on the age pro¯le of bequests is of particular interest. Unlike other pro¯les, the age pro¯le of bequest is not necessarily rising over time even if the marginal utility of bequest is declining with age. This is because, in our model, life insurance purchase is to maintain the bene¯ciary's standard of living until his age of independence in the event of the breadwinner's untimely death.
Such a need for protection declines as the child ages. If this age factor is the dominant factor, then the size of the bequest shrinks as the child grows up. We show that this is indeed the case if the bene¯ciary's utility function is isoelastic.
We also show that the birth order matters. When there are multiple children, the younger child would inherit a larger bequest. In contrast, the theory of primogeniture predicts the opposite allocation of resources. These results are not contradictory to each other because primogeniture applies mainly to adult heirs. Our birth-order result is derived from the fact that the breadwinner provides equal protection for all children up to their respective ages of independence.
Since the model assumes away child mortality, the younger one has a longer way to go before reaching independence and, therefore, needs more protection. Along this line of reasoning, the theory predicts that the breadwinner would provide handicapped children a longer period of income transfer if he lives, and leave a larger bequest if he dies, since handicapped children need more protection.
Finally, we derive a closed-form demand for life insurance if the utility function is isoelastic. We show that the demand for life insurance is negatively related to the loading factor and savings, but is positively related to the bene¯ciary's risk aversion { all of these are quite intuitive. More importantly, we show that the demand for life insurance is positively related to the number, the age di®eren-tials, and the living standards of the bene¯ciaries. Shorrocks's criticisms are thus addressed.
The Model
We¯rst present Fischer's (1973) celebrated model with a minor change in timing.
Let T be the maximal period that the breadwinner can live. Throughout the paper, the only source of uncertainty is the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty.
Let p t be the conditional probability that the breadwinner dies at the beginning of period t · T ; given survival to period t ¡ 1: By de¯nition, p T +1 = 1: The decision to purchase life insurance is made at the end of period t ¡ 1; or the beginning of period t before the true state of nature is revealed. We make this change in timing so that when we present our model the insurance decision would resemble that of a static insurance problem.
The revelation of the true state of nature over time is described by an event tree. If the breadwinner lives through period t ¡ 1, then he accumulates wealth w t for period t from which he spends a portion of his wealth, k t w t , the insurance premium, to purchase term life insurance with face value q t k t w t ; where 1=q t is the price of insurance. In short, the breadwinner enters period t with wealth
If the breadwinner did not die at the beginning of period t, then he chooses consumption c t for himself and accumulates
for period t + 1. If he died, he left behind (1 ¡ k t ) w t + q t k t w t to his heirs. Then, the breadwinner solves the following recursive problem
where u t is the utility function,¯is the discount factor, J t is the current value of the discounted expected utility function at the beginning of period t, and B t is the bequest function. Since k T = 0 and J T +1 = 0, the problem is solved by backward induction.
The departure from Fischer's model is that we shall include the recipient's utility in the breadwinner's decision problem. For the purpose of exposition, we begin with only one dependent. In this context, the initial period is regarded as the bene¯ciary's year of birth. Then, the bene¯ciary's consumption becomes one of the breadwinner's choice variables. This inclusion is made for two reasons.
First, many dependents live primarily on the breadwinner's support until they reach independence. We shall call T the bene¯ciary's age of independence, 3 if he reaches independence at the beginning of period T +1; with T < T . Second, since life insurance purchase depends on how long the needs of the bene¯ciary are, we include the bene¯ciary's utility function in the breadwinner's optimization problem only up to period T , the age of independence.
Again, we consider only term life insurance that has no cash value and therefore no savings component. Let the degree of unfairness of the insurance market be summarized by`t (`t¸1) ; the loading factor of period t. Since`tp t is the price of life insurance (i.e., the price paid for one dollar coverage of life insurance), the insurance premium for face value f t¸0 is`tp t f t :
If the breadwinner died in the beginning of period t, the bene¯ciary would receive an asset, w t + (1 ¡`tp t ) f t ; that is composed of savings, w t ¡`tp t f t ; and the face value of life insurance, f t . This is Kotliko®'s (1989) \contingent bequest."
As we shall see later, another departure from Fischer's model is the speci¯cation of the bequest function
Since the purchase of life insurance is based on the needs of helping the child reach independence, we assume that the bene¯ciary (or the guardian) will use this bequest optimally to achieve that goal.
On the other hand, if the breadwinner lived through period t, then he would earn income y t (exogenously given) and choose consumption c t for himself and transfer g t ¡`tp t f t¸0 to the bene¯ciary, where g t represents gifts inter vivos.
Notice that we make insurance premium`tp t f t a component of gifts inter vivos so that the insurance purchase viewed from the bene¯ciary's perspective would resemble that in the static model. More precisely, the demand for insurance can be derived from comparing the income of the good state, g t ¡`tp t f t ; to that of the bad state, w t + (1 ¡`tp t ) f t . Such an advantage would be lost if we put the insurance premium in the budget equation.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no human capital investment in the model, even though part of the income transfer may be used for dependent's education. Then the budget equation is
given the initial wealth, w 0 : Let the bene¯ciary's utility function be v t (¢). As usual, u t (¢), B t (¢) and v t (¢) are assumed strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Then, for t · T , the breadwinner solves the recursive problem
subject to (2:1) : For t¸T + 1; Fischer's formulation applies.
Assuming interior solutions, the¯rst order conditions for (2:2) are, for t · T;
3) says that, in any period, the marginal rate of substitution between the two states is equal to the relative price of insurance. Equation (2:4), on the other hand, says that the marginal utility of current consumption (or that of income transfer) is equal to the discounted expected marginal utility of future income. In short, equation (2:3) is the optimal condition across states, while equation (2:4) is the optimal condition across time.
An immediate corollary is that
It follows that the contingent bequest, w t + (1 ¡`tp t ) f t ; is positively related to the bene¯ciary's consumption level when the breadwinner is alive, g t ¡`tp t f t . As such, the purchase of life insurance is to guarantee the bene¯ciary's standard of living as claimed.
A remark on the model is in order. While it bears some resemblance to Lewis's (1989) model, there is a fundamental di®erence in modeling. To see this, we set = 1 and convert the breadwinner's problem into a two-stage maximization problem. In the¯rst stage, the breadwinner maximizes (2:2) for a given ff t g :
Let fc
¤ t g and fg ¤ t g be the corresponding optimal solutions. The second stage 8 optimization problem is to maximize
by choosing ff t g. Then the purchase of life insurance is indeed to maximize the bene¯ciary's utility from birth to age T , as contended by Lewis 
Precautionary Saving and Income Transfer
To study the age pro¯les of the breadwinner's consumption and income transfer, consider the case that the breadwinner live through period T . For t · T; the Euler equations are
If the insurance market is actuarially fair, then (3:1) is reduced to u 0 t¡1 (c t¡1 ) = (1 + r) u 0 t (c t ) ; which is standard in the life cycle theory. See, for example, Tobin (1967) . Similarly, (3:2) becomes v
Recall that¯stands for the time preference derived from factors other than lifetime uncertainty. Then, the subjective discount factor is¯(1 ¡ p t ). By ignoring r`tp (a small number) and the higher order terms of p t ; we have
Since`tp t is the price of life insurance, r +`tp t is the actuarial rate of interest. In other words, with the purchase of life insurance, the proper discount rate is not the market interest rate, but the actuarial rate of interest. This is standard in uncertain lifetime literature. See, for example, Chang (1991) .
The presence of the loading factor in the Euler equations is a new result. It has an interesting implication on the breadwinner's consumption pro¯le. Under
; for all t · T , the age pro¯le of consumption of the breadwinner is upward sloping. In other words, if the preference is stable over time and the actuarial rate of interest is greater than or equal to the subjective discount rate (i.e., r +`tp t¸½ + p t , where 1 + ½ = 1=¯), then there is delayed consumption. More importantly, an increase in the loading factor, and hence an increase in the actuarial rate of interest, produces an upward tilt to the breadwinner's consumption pro¯le. Simply put, an increase in market unfairness increases precautionary saving.
To see the signi¯cance of the loading factor e®ect on precautionary saving, we assume u t (x) = u (x) = x 1¡® = (1 ¡ ®) ; ® > 0. Then the consumption pro¯le satis¯es c t = R t c t¡1 ; where
is the growth rate of consumption. In contrast, R t = (r ¡ ½) =® in Tobin's model (`t = 1). The additional growth rate, (`t ¡ 1) p t =®, which rises with the loading factor`t and the mortality rate p t ; is thus attributed to the unfairness of the insurance market and the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty. From the Similarly, the theory predicts that income transfer would rise with age if
for all t · T . In his well-known study, particularly his Table 3 , Espenshade (1984) shows that as children age (up to age 18) they tend to become more expensive. Older children cost more because, among others, they are physically larger and have more activities. Our model does not take into account any of these factors. Rather, the result is implied by the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty and the unfairness of the insurance market. In other words, our result provides an additional reason for Espenshade's¯ndings. The inclusion of college expenditures would only strengthen, not weaken, the result. The theory also predicts that income transfer would be further delayed if the loading factor increases.
Contingent Bequest
The implication on the bequest-age relation, however, is di®erent. As mentioned earlier, a departure of the paper from Fischer's model is that we speci¯cally assume that the breadwinner leaves the bequest with a clear purpose of helping the child reach independence and that the bene¯ciary will use the bequest optimally. To make it tractable, we ignore the fact that the bene¯ciary may want to save some of this bequest for the use beyond age T . We also assume the bene¯ciary's subjective discount rate equals the market interest rate, i.e., assume the discount factor is
(1 + r) t¡j v (x j ) ; s:t:
It is easy to verify that, with r = 0,
See, e.g., Philipson and Becker (1998) . Note that this bequest function is age dependent. Then
If the marginal utility of bequest rises with age, then
i.e., contingent bequest falls with time. Next, assume the age pro¯le of the marginal utility of bequest is downward sloping. Since T ¡ s + 1 > T ¡ t + 1 and
; 8s < t; we cannot conclude that x s < x t . In fact, the opposite could happen, i.e., contingent bequest falls with time, if the rate of decline in the marginal utilities of bequest is fairly small. This is quite possible because`t, p t , and hence`t (1¡pt) 1¡`tpt , rise with age, which implies that the slope of
The intuition behind this result is that the bene¯ciary's need for protection declines as the child grows up, which makes a declining age pro¯le of bequest possible. This bequest-age relation is germane to Pissarides's (1980) ¯nding (his b 3 curve).
To complete the argument for r > 0; we assume that the utility function is of the form v (x) = x 1¡¸= (1 ¡¸) ;¸> 0: Then the bequest function can be written as
; 8s < t:
By de¯nition, b (t; T ) is increasing in T ¡ t + 1. Clearly, the aforementioned argument applies and the bequest could fall as the bene¯ciary grows up.
In reality, the bene¯ciaries are minors and therefore do not receive direct bequests. Often the funds are placed in the hands of the surviving parents, legal guardian or placed in trust for children until they reach adulthood. It seems reasonable to assume that whoever is in charge would have the bene¯ciary's best interest in mind and that the bene¯ciary's utility up to the age of independence is maximized, as the decedent would have wished.
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Birth Order E®ect
When there are two or more children, the model becomes quite complicated within the framework of the expected utility maximization, because there are issues arising from infertility, child mortality and time inconsistency. To make the model tractable and to make the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty the only source of uncertainty, we shall make some simplifying assumptions. Speci¯cally, we assume away child mortality so that all dependents will reach independence with certainty, and assume perfect family planning such that the number of children and their age di®erentials are nonstochastic and exogenously given.
For the purpose of exposition, the model is set for two dependents. The¯rst period represents the year the¯rst child is born. This child reaches independence at T 1 = T . The second child will be born in period t 2 · T 1 and reaches independence at age T 2 = T + t 2 ¡ 1: The division of assets at the breadwinner's death is denoted by » i t ; the percentage of assets given to bene¯ciary i; with » Then the breadwinner's problem, for t · T 2 , is
with the understanding that, for t < t 2 , g
2 t = 0, and for
Naturally, for t > T 2 , the problem is simpli¯ed to
The total transfer is g t = g 1 t + g 2 t ; while the total purchase of life insurance is
The law of motion is still (2:1) :
The expenditure on each child is governed by (5:2) : Under the usual conditions, the expenditure rises with age. An interesting implication is this: Given the initial wealth and earning pro¯le fy t g ; an increase in the number of children lowers each consumption pro¯le, including the breadwinner's. Moreover, the aggregate expenditure on children tends to peak just before the oldest child reaches independence. These results reinforce Espenshade's (1984) ¯ndings that the number of children has a greater impact on parental expenditures than the parents' socioeconomic status and wife's employment status. Equation (5:3) says that the contingent bequest for child i is positively related to g To highlight the birth order e®ect, we assume the bene¯ciaries have identical tastes, i.e.,¸1 =¸2. Then both bene¯ciaries would receive the same amount of income transfer while the breadwinner is alive. However, it is not so for contingent bequests. More precisely, from (5:4) and b (t; T 1 ) < b (t; T 2 ) ; the bequest to the older child is smaller than the bequest to the younger child 5 , i.e.,
The intuition is that each child would receive \equal protection" from the breadwinner up to the age of independence. The older child, who has been protected for some time, clearly needs less protection than the younger sibling. An immediate corollary is that the breadwinner will leave a larger bequest to the handicapped children than to those who are not handicapped, since it takes a handicapped child a longer time to reach independence.
The theory remains valid for
. In this case, equation (5:4) becomes
Once again, the younger child would receive a larger bequest. For t > T 2 , equal division (
This birth order result may appear contradictory to the theory of primogeniture and many empirical¯ndings. But, it is not. On the theoretic front, Chu (1991) shows that in the pursuit for lineal succession, when dependents' lifetimes are uncertain, the older child would receive a larger bequest. Since we assume away the issue of child mortality, our result is not at odds with his theory. On empirical front, most¯ndings of primogeniture are based on the bequests to adult beneciaries, while our theory applies to the very young and¯nancially constrained children.
Demand for Life Insurance
The demand for life insurance, f i t ; is jointly determined with consumption c t and income transfer g i t . Consequently, the comparative statics should be jointly determined as well. To facilitate the analysis, we follow Lewis's approximation method of setting p t ¼ 0. This can be justi¯ed from Table 1 , since the conditional probability of death is generally below 2% for ages 50 and younger, the time to raise a family. Then`t (1¡pt) 1¡`tpt ¼`t and equation (5:3) is simpli¯ed to
Consequently, the (aggregate) demand for life insurance is
The aggregate demand for life insurance thus obtained is negatively related to loading factor`t and savings w t , but positively related to risk aversion¸: These are fairly standard results.
An interesting implication of equation (6:1) is that the aggregate demand for life insurance rises with b (t;
It shows that the demand for life insurance depends on the number, the age di®erentials, the time it takes for each child to reach independence, and the consumption need of the bene¯ciaries. In short, the demand for life insurance thus obtained re°ects the \needs" and the \circumstances" of the bene¯ciaries. It should be mentioned that equation (6:1) a generalization of Lewis' equation (11) From (6:1) ; the elasticity of life insurance with respect to the loading factor is Lewis (1989) In this paper we presented a theory of life insurance purchase of an altruistic breadwinner supporting his liquidity constrained children. The model takes the ages and the consumption need of the dependent children explicitly into account.
Conclusion and Comparisons to
It di®ers from Fischer's (1975) model in that the choice between the breadwinner's own consumption and that of the bene¯ciary is endogenous, there are gifts inter vivos, and that the purchase of life insurance depends on the number and the circumstances of the dependent children.
Lewis had the same objective. However, there are major di®erences. Lewis assumes that the breadwinner's own consumption and the gifts to the heirs are exogenously given. In contrast, our model allows the dependent's utility function to enter the breadwinner's optimization problem. In our dynamic setting, the breadwinner's consumption, gifts inter vivos, life insurance purchase, and contingent bequests are jointly determined in a single model. As a result, several interesting economic implications that go beyond Lewis'¯ndings emerge.
First, our theory provides some new insights into the life cycle theory. We show that the breadwinner's own lifetime uncertainty and the altruism toward heirs are incentives for precautionary saving. Speci¯cally, we show that the consumption pro¯le is steeper than the one derived from the standard life-cycle model because the growth rate of consumption depends positively on the breadwinner's mortality rate and the unfairness of the insurance market. It may account for some of the observed delayed consumption than previously recognized.
Second, our theory sheds some lights on the role of the dependents' ages in the breadwinner's decision making. As the child ages, the need for protection is reduced, and hence, the time path of bequest to each child may decline with the child's age. When there are several children, the younger child have a larger bequest because the older child need less protection { a result opposite of primogeniture. We also show that the gifts inter vivos grow with each child's age as a result of the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty, thereby provides an additional reason for this empirical fact. In addition, the demand for life insurance depends on the ages of children as shown in (6:1).
Third, we show that the number of children matters in a variety of ways. As the number of children increase, there is an additional saving to meet the future need. The age pro¯le of consumption of the breadwinner is lowered as the number of children increases, if the breadwinner's earning pro¯le remains unchanged. The same is true for income transfer and bequest. Furthermore, the age pro¯le of gifts inter vivos for each child rises with age, and the aggregate transfer peaks just right before the oldest child reaches the age of independence. Moreover, the demand for life insurance clearly re°ects the number and the needs of the bene¯ciaries.
It should be mentioned that we have made some simplifying assumptions to make the model tractable. Speci¯cally, we assume perfect family planning on the timing and age di®erentials of children, and assume away child mortality so that all dependents will live to their respective ages of independence. We also minimize the role played by the surviving spouse in the purchase of life insurance. Relaxing these assumptions would test the robustness of the theory developed in this paper.
For example, it would be interesting to compare this theory of contingent bequest to Chu's theory of primogeniture in the presence of child mortality. These are for future research.
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